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Key messages
 • Understanding adaptation-mitigation linkages helps identify co-benefits and reduce negative 
interactions between the two climate change domains. 
 • Barriers include working in institutional siloes and lack of information: adaptation actors are not well-
informed about mitigation actions and vice-versa. 
 • Policy network analysis sheds light on adaptation-mitigation actor interactions and what can be done to 
improve them. 
 • It reveals both the usual and unusual suspects who can foster linkages between the two domains. 
 • This InfoBrief summarizes the findings of a climate change policy network analysis conducted in Peru 
and published in the journal Climate Policy (Locatelli et al. 2020).  
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Usual and unusual suspects
What network analysis can tell us about climate policy integration
Introduction
In one of the key scenes of the legendary film 
Casablanca (1942), Captain Louis Renault orders 
his police officers to “round up the usual suspects” 
instead of arresting the culprit, Rick Blaine. Those of 
us concerned with climate change are frequently 
doing the same. Even though policy action on both 
adaptation and mitigation is not a crime, we tend to 
think in terms of ‘usual suspects’ when we look for 
the climate champions or for those holding the key to 
change. We tend to ignore the ‘unusual suspects’, the 
ones that are invisible or unheard but that can make or 
break climate action (see Figure 1).
Why do we need both adaptation and mitigation? 
Temperatures are already 1.3 °C degrees warmer than 
in the pre-industrial period and the world is on track 
for at least 3 °C of global warming (Lenton et al. 2019). 
Adaptation is a necessity, as is strong mitigation action, 
and these two essential strategies for fighting climate 
change are interlinked. This is especially evident in the 
land-use sectors. For example, forests and agricultural 
systems are vulnerable to climate change but they can also 
help people adapt. At the same time, they are important 
sinks and sources of greenhouse gases. 
A particular climate action related to land use can produce 
co-benefits for adaptation, mitigation and sustainable 
development, but can also have unintended consequences 
(Locatelli et al. 2015). The integration of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation policy objectives and processes 
helps to identify these mutually beneficial practices and 
reduce the negative interactions. It means including joint 
adaptation and mitigation objectives in intervention design 
where this makes sense, and ensuring that policy actors 
interested in either adaptation or mitigation coordinate 
among themselves (Di Gregorio et al. 2017). This is needed 
in addition to mainstreaming climate change into the 
policy processes of other sectors. 
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The first step would be to facilitate communication and 
coordination between the policy actors that engage 
in climate change adaptation and mitigation policy 
processes. This, however, is quite difficult. National 
policies and programs usually target only one strategy 
– either adaptation or mitigation – and decision-makers 
tend to work within their sectoral silos. People who 
engage with adaptation are often not fully informed 
about mitigation processes and vice versa.
Institutional barriers separating the adaptation and mitigation 
domains, differences in knowledge about adaptation and 
mitigation needs, and low capacity for coordination are 
challenges that characterize climate policy processes. Policy 
network analysis can reveal some of the barriers to, and 
provide insights on possible opportunities for, better actor 
communication and coordination. It can reveal which policy 
actors are in a better position to connect the adaptation and 
mitigation policy domains (both usual and unusual suspects). 
This brief summarizes the results of a policy network 
analysis conducted in Peru and published in the journal 
Climate Policy (Locatelli et al. 2020). 
Why policy network analysis? 
Climate change policy networks involve state and non-
state actors from different sectors and levels, each aiming 
to influence ongoing policy processes and outcomes. 
Policy network analysis builds on social network analysis; it 
investigates how relevant actors interact in order to reveal 
those social patterns, resource interdependencies and power 
relations through which climate policy is elaborated and 
implemented (Brockhaus et al. 2014). It also reveals who the 
dominant and the more isolated actors are, the mediators 
that can foster new collaborations or relationships between 
different groups (also known as ‘brokers’), and the network 
structures that can enable or limit them.
This information can be valuable for understanding 
malfunctions and for designing strategies that can enhance 
institutional networking. In the case of isolated actors, for 
example, strategies for building interorganizational relations 
can be devised, as they are an important aspect of climate 
change governance. The complexity of climate governance 
requires managing diverse interests and resolving conflicts 
across multiple sectors and policy actors, from the local to the 
Figure 1. Workshop on climate change policy networks in Lima, Peru, where participants were tasked with 
identifying the usual and unusual suspects (photo by Bruno Locatelli). 
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international levels. Working toward climate policy integration 
necessitates: (i) understanding whether adaptation and 
mitigation policy processes are connected or not, and if 
they are connected, determining how they are connected; 
and (ii) understanding how the climate change policy 
arena is structured. 
Adaptation–mitigation 
interactions in the policy network
To document the interactions in Peru among and between 
actors involved with adaptation and actors involved with 
mitigation, we conducted a survey and semistructured 
interviews with representatives of 76 different 
organizations engaged with national-level policy processes. 
We asked the representatives to indicate the actors with 
which their organization regularly exchanged information 
on adaptation and with which it has collaborated. We 
asked the same questions concerning mitigation, in 
addition to asking which organizations they perceived as 
particularly influential in adaptation policy processes, and 
which in the mitigation ones. 
We thus had six different relations to analyze: 
information exchange on (i) adaptation or (ii) mitigation; 
collaboration on (iii) adaptation or (iv) mitigation issues; 
and perceived influence in (v) the adaptation domain 
or (vi) the mitigation domain. The two adaptation and 
mitigation domains represented different ‘layers’ in our 
climate change policy network, which we constructed as 
a ‘multilayer network’ (Dickison 2016). We explored each 
layer separately and in an integrated way; we examined 
interlayer dynamics to find our suspects, that is, which 
organizations broker relationships within and across the 
two domains of adaptation and mitigation. 
In a multilayer network, policy actors are connected 
through more than one relation; for example, an 
organization can be tied to another by communication 
flows, by joint projects or by both. In our case, policy actors 
are tied by information exchange and collaboration related 
to adaptation and/or mitigation. In a stylized fictitious 
example (Figure 2), actors are represented by purple dots 
and are tied by blue lines (information or collaboration ties) 
in two layers: adaptation and mitigation. 
The same actors are present in both adaptation and 
mitigation layers, as they are all engaged with climate 
change policy processes. Some might be inactive in 
one of the two layers; for example, nongovernment 
organization (NGO) “A” does not interact with any other 
entities on adaptation issues. Ministry “B” is a central actor 
in adaptation and also an important broker, connecting 
many actors that might otherwise remain unconnected in 
this layer. Ministry “B” is also a broker within the mitigation 
layer and between the two layers. Whereas NGO “A”, 
Ministry “B” and Regional Government “C” are brokers in 
mitigation, Figure 2 shows that they play different roles 
in connecting actors between layers: “A” does not play 
any role, whereas “B” and “C” do, even though “C” is not a 
broker in adaptation.
Figure 2. Stylized multilayer network. The same actors are present in each layer, with the blue lines showing 
their interactions with other actors. Each red vertical line connects the same actor in the two domain layers of 
adaptation and mitigation. 
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Figure 3. Representation of the climate change policy network in Peru, with the two layers containing information 
and collaboration exchanges on adaptation (left) and on mitigation (right), and the coupling ties in between. 
Circles represent actors. Circle colors represent organization types (e.g., national government or international 
NGOs; see Locatelli et al. 2020, for details).
Actors and connections 
In the Peruvian climate change policy network, there were 
more connections between actors in the mitigation layer 
(higher density), as compared with the adaptation one, 
which shows that there was more activity in the mitigation 
domain at the time of the interviews. We expected this 
result given that, historically, mitigation has attracted more 
international attention and resources than adaptation. 
Furthermore, in our network, if an actor showed high 
reputational power in the mitigation layer, this increased 
the probability of other actors forming ties with that actor 
in both layers (and not only in the mitigation one). 
Similarly, one of the few other studies that look at the 
interactions between adaptation and mitigation policy 
processes demonstrated higher activity in the mitigation 
domain in Brazil and Indonesia (Di Gregorio et al. 2019). 
The usual suspects in national climate policy processes 
– national government organizations, foreign agencies 
and intergovernmental organizations – were the most 
central in both the adaptation and mitigation layers 
of our case study. A central actor in our study means 
that many other actors have indicated relational ties 
with this particular actor (the higher the centrality, the 
bigger the circle in the representation of Figure 3). As a 
group, national government organizations topped this 
type of centrality, indicating national ownership of the 
climate change agenda in Peru, as well as a good level of 
institutionalization of climate  change responses. 
The least-connected actors in both levels were big 
private-sector companies and subnational civil society 
organizations (CSOs), indicating an isolation of groups 
that matter for the implementation of adaptation and 
mitigation measures. However, not all isolated actors have 
the same role and resources and there are major power 
asymmetries between them.
The big private-sector companies might appear to be 
isolated because they do not currently prioritize climate 
change issues (and thus do not want to engage with 
them), because they do in fact interact with central actors 
but invisibly, or because they do not need to act at all 
(as their interests are automatically taken into account 
due to their power and general access to politicians). The 
isolation of smaller CSOs, on the other hand, reflects the 
typical distribution of power in society. This is problematic 
because engagement with CSOs, and especially local 
CSOs, is highly important for ensuring that climate change 
measures are environmentally and socially just. 
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We found many organizations from different groups to be 
well-positioned in the network for brokering relationships 
between the two layers of adaptation and mitigation. The 
usual suspects were rounded up: actors with mandates 
that span across both domains and with high centrality 
and brokerage in both layers. Indeed, many top interlayer 
brokers were national government actors and international 
organizations that had a good brokerage position in both 
adaptation and mitigation, or at least in one of the two 
layers. But there were some unusual suspects as well that 
were also in good brokerage positions. 
These unusual suspects, for example a regional government 
organization and a producers’ association, were not brokers 
in any of the two layers separately, and nor did they exhibit 
a notably high centrality in one or both layers. Despite their 
low profile in the adaptation and mitigation domains, 
they appeared very important as mediators across the 
adaptation and mitigation layers because they were the 
only potential links between several actors that might 
otherwise remain unconnected.
Contrary to this, some actors with high centrality in both 
layers, and a mandate to work with and connect multiple 
actors (e.g. a foreign agency with a large portfolio of 
climate activities in Peru), were surprisingly absent from 
the top ranks of interlayer brokers. Our suspicions about 
several usual suspects were thus not confirmed. Our usual 
suspects might have ended with a low brokerage score 
as a result of their success: they built ties and triggered 
other actors to form direct ties, and consequently, their 
brokerage was not needed anymore (Burt 2009). 
Rounding up all suspects
Policy network analysis is a relevant approach for assessing 
the integration of policy processes. This approach can help 
identify all the actors that can foster linkages between 
domains, as well as the structures of power that can support 
or hinder more effective and just implementation of climate 
policies and measures. For example, supporting the actors 
that play a critical role in bridging adaptation and mitigation 
is often needed to further sustain and strengthen the 
linkages between the domains. This might mean providing 
better access to some of the unusual suspects in formal 
climate change bodies or processes. It might also mean 
bringing the activities of some actors to the forefront, so that 
their role and contributions are better understood, and so 
they can be held accountable for their actions by those with 
less power. 
Policy network studies such as ours provide a snapshot 
of what is happening in climate change policy arenas at 
a particular point in time. But if redone periodically, they 
can help us understand how network structure and power 
evolve in climate governance and whether or not climate 
policy integration improves over time.
Recommendations
• National government organizations can facilitate 
communication and coordination among actors 
involved in climate change policies and processes due 
to their centrality. 
• They can activate institutional structures or 
coordination bodies that include and support isolated 
actors (e.g. subnational organizations) or actors who can 
reach out to many others (e.g. brokers). 
• These bodies should first encourage actors to share 
information about activities and other knowledge, but 
without causing coordination fatigue or high  
transaction costs. 
• Actors in good positions to broker relationships 
between organizations will need incentives and 
support to actually engage in doing so. 
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